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Research Summary: To address endogeneity con-
cerns stemming from firm-CEO matching, we deploy a
two-sided matching model that identifies the comple-
mentarities arising from the CEO-firm match and sub-
sequently account for these complementarities in
empirical tests. Applying this approach, we examine
how the nature of CEOs' human capital affects the
acquisition behavior and performance of firms. We find
that generalist CEOs (CEOs with a broader set of
knowledge and skills) are more likely to engage in
unrelated acquisitions than specialist CEOs (CEOs with
a narrower but deeper set of knowledge and skills). We
also find that the fit between the nature of CEOs'
human capital and the type of acquisitions they under-
take is associated with stronger performance. Our paper
contributes to research on CEOs, human capital,
M&As, and microfoundations.
Managerial Summary: We deploy an empirical
approach that takes into account the complementarities
that arise from the matching of CEOs and firms when
testing hypotheses on how CEO attributes shape firm
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outcomes. Based on this approach, our study finds that
CEOs with a broader set of managerial knowledge and
skills (generalist CEOs) are more likely to engage in
unrelated acquisitions (acquisitions outside a firm's
main industry) than CEOs with a narrower but deeper
set of knowledge and skills that is more closely tied to a
particular industry, firm, or domain (specialist CEOs).
We also find that the fit between the nature of CEOs'
human capital and the type of acquisitions they engage
in is associated with stronger performance.
KEYWORD S
acquisitions, CEOs, human capital, microfoundations, two-sided
matching
1 | INTRODUCTION
The human capital of managers is an important factor that can shape the success of firms
(e.g., Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr, & Ketchen Jr, 2011; Hitt, Bierman,
Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). Within this line of research, a substantial body of prior research
suggests that the nature or type of human capital matters (e.g., Castanias & Helfat, 2001;
Chatain & Meyer-Doyle, 2017; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012). Yet
comparatively little is known about how the nature of the human capital of managers shapes
the strategic behavior of firms and how the fit between the human capital of managers and the
strategic behavior they undertake shapes firm performance. However, such knowledge is
important to better explain heterogeneity in firm behavior and performance, and it appears par-
ticularly relevant in the context of the nature of the CEO's human capital, given the substantial
impact that CEOs can have on firms (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Liu, Fisher, &
Chen, 2018; Meyer-Doyle, Lee, & Helfat, 2019).
When testing hypotheses related to how CEO attributes affect firm-level outcomes, the
sorting of CEOs into firms can potentially create an endogeneity bias. Methods used by the
prior strategic leadership literature to deal with this issue include propensity score matching
(PSM) and the Heckman two-step method. However, these methods do not easily account for
the complementarities that the matching of CEOs and firms creates (Mindruta, Moeen, &
Agarwal, 2016; Pan, 2017), which may confound the estimates of the impact of CEO attributes
on firms. While two-sided matching models can identify the complementarities between CEOs
and firms, such models have rarely been used in the CEO literature and it is nontrivial to
address the endogeneity concerns arising from a nonrandom selection of CEOs into firms
through an empirical approach that accounts for the complementarities of the firm-CEO match
when examining how CEO attributes affect firm-level outcomes.
Building on the above theoretical and empirical gaps, this paper explores how the nature of
CEOs' human capital affects the strategic behavior of firms, whether CEOs engage in opportuni-
ties that correspond to the nature of their human capital, and whether the fit between the
nature of CEOs' human capital and the strategic actions they engage in is associated with
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stronger performance. To study these issues, we focus on the distinction between generalist and
specialist CEOs (Custódio, Ferreira, & Matos, 2013), and on the context of acquisitions. Specifi-
cally, we examine whether generalist CEOs (CEOs with a broader set of managerial knowledge
and skills) are more likely to engage in acquisitions than specialist CEOs (CEOs with a
narrower but deeper set of knowledge and skills that are more closely tied to a particular indus-
try, firm, or domain). We also examine what type of acquisitions generalist and specialist CEOs
are more likely to engage in, and whether the fit between CEOs' human capital and the type of
acquisitions they undertake is associated with better performance. Importantly, to alleviate
endogeneity concerns that arise from the matching of CEOs and firms, we use a two-sided
matching model (Fox, 2010; Fox, 2018) to identify the complementarities arising from the CEO-
firm match, and then adopt an empirical approach that accounts for these complementarities
when examining how the nature of the CEO's human capital shapes the type of acquisitions
they engage in and how the fit between the human capital of the CEO and the acquisition type
affects performance.
Our initial and preliminary results suggest that, on average, generalist CEOs are more
acquisitive than specialists. Furthermore, conditional on their engaging in acquisitions, general-
ist CEOs are more likely to undertake diversifying (unrelated) acquisitions than their specialist
CEO counterparts. These results are consistent with the idea that CEOs engage in strategic
behavior that corresponds to the nature of their human capital. We also observe that the fit
between the nature of CEOs' human capital and the type of acquisitions they engage in is asso-
ciated, on average, with stronger performance. Interestingly, our subsequent analyses that
account for the complementarities of the CEO-firm match suggest that our initial finding that
generalist CEOs engage in more acquisitions is at least in part driven by the matching of gener-
alist CEOs and firms with generalist boards. However, the rest of our findings remain robust to
accounting for the complementarities of the CEO-firm match.
Our paper contributes to the strategic leadership literature by using a two-sided matching
model to identify the complementarities of the firm-CEO match and subsequently accounting
for these complementarities when examining how CEO characteristics shape firm outcomes.
Future research in this field that aims to understand how CEO characteristics shape firm out-
comes can utilize this empirical approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns that stem from the
matching of firms and CEOs. Our paper also contributes to the literature on human capital and
to research on microfoundations in strategy by highlighting how the nature of CEOs' human
capital may affect the strategic behavior of firms. We show that managers tend to engage in
strategic actions that correspond to their human capital, and that such a fit is associated with
stronger performance. Further, our findings also contribute to the literature on acquisitions by
highlighting an important factor—the nature of the CEO's human capital and how it is
deployed to acquisition opportunities—that can affect acquisition behavior and performance.
2 | GENERALIST VERSUS SPECIALIST CEOS AND FIRM
ACQUISITION OUTCOMES
An important characteristic of the nature of the human capital of top managers is the extent to
which they have gained general managerial knowledge and skills that are not specific to a par-
ticular industry, firm, or domain (e.g., Custódio et al., 2013; Custódio, Ferreira, & Matos, 2019;
Li & Patel, 2019), with studies making a distinction between generalists (i.e., those with a
broader set of managerial knowledge and skills which are not specific to a particular industry,
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firm, or domain) and specialists (i.e., those with a narrower but deeper set of knowledge and
skills that is more closely tied to a specific industry, firm, or domain). In this regard, there is an
inherent tradeoff between CEOs' possession of a broader set of managerial knowledge and skills
and their possession of a narrower specialist set of skills that are specific to an industry, firm, or
domain. While prior research suggests that the firm-specificity of human capital is important
(Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Hatch & Dyer, 2004), the knowledge and skills of managers that are
not specific to a firm may still be valuable for that firm and have an important impact on firm
outcomes.1
The CEO of a firm plays an important role and his/her human capital can be a key factor
shaping firm outcomes. Despite prior important contributions (e.g., Crossland, Zyung, Hiller, &
Hambrick, 2014; Custódio et al., 2019; Custódio & Metzger, 2013), we still lack a more compre-
hensive understanding of how the nature of a CEO's human capital (e.g., being a generalist or
specialist) affects the type of strategic behavior the CEO engages in and how the fit between the
CEO's human capital and the strategic behavior undertaken shapes firm performance. An
important type of strategic behavior is the acquisitions a firm engages in. Accordingly, in this
paper we develop hypotheses on how being a generalist CEO or specialist CEO influences a
firm's acquisition behavior and performance.
We first argue that generalist CEOs engage in a greater number of acquisitions than their
specialist counterparts. At the CEO level, acquisitions can benefit from CEOs commanding a
broader set of managerial knowledge and skills that are not specific to a particular industry,
firm, or domain (i.e., generalist CEOs). Specifically, acquisitions can benefit from CEOs holding
general managerial knowledge and skills about when to engage in acquisitions, how to find
suitable acquisition opportunities, how to evaluate and value companies, how to negotiate and
structure acquisition deals, how to finance and execute corporate transactions, and how to
obtain the backing from stakeholders. On the contrary, successfully choosing, planning, and
executing an alternative path of corporate growth—internal development initiatives—often
requires CEOs' substantial in-depth knowledge of the industry and firm (i.e., knowledge and
skills that are typically associated with specialist CEOs).
We expect that CEOs select strategic actions that correspond to the nature of their human
capital for two reasons: First, a good fit between the nature of the CEO's human capital and the
strategic actions he or she undertakes has the potential to create more value from the CEO's
human capital for the firm, allowing the CEO to potentially share some of the greater value cre-
ated (see also Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Second, following a behavioral logic, a CEO is also
more likely to engage in activities that correspond to his or her knowledge and skills as this
reduces the effort and risk involved in devising and executing unfamiliar strategic actions. Thus,
we argue that generalist CEOs are more likely to engage in acquisitions than their specialist
counterparts, who are more likely to engage in internal development.
Hypothesis (H1). Generalist CEOs engage in a greater number of acquisitions than special-
ist CEOs.
To further examine whether CEOs engage in strategic actions that correspond to the nature
of their human capital and whether the fit between their human capital and the strategic
1Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) suggest an increasing relative importance of general managerial skills at the top-
management level, and Custódio et al. (2013) show that generalist CEOs are paid more than their specialist
counterparts, which implies that their human capital is valuable and that it may have an important impact on firms.
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initiatives they choose affects performance, we explore the type of acquisitions CEOs undertake
when they acquire, and the performance implications thereof. An important characteristic of
an acquisition is whether it is an unrelated (i.e., diversifying) or a related (i.e., non-diversifying)
acquisition (e.g., Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; Haleblian, Pfarrer, & Kiley, 2017; Singh &
Montgomery, 1987).
An acquisition is typically considered an unrelated acquisition if the target operates in a
different industry from the acquirer. In such acquisitions, the acquirer and target are usu-
ally different in terms of their products, markets, or technology; in unrelated acquisitions,
the level of integration between the acquirer and target following the acquisition is typically
low since the companies often do not have a high need for interdependence and since such
acquisitions may benefit from greater levels of autonomy provided to the target (see also
Datta & Grant, 1990; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Important ways in which the CEO can
add value in an unrelated acquisition include the selection of a good investment opportu-
nity, the negotiation with the parties involved, the design of an effective deal structure, and
the possession of superior management skills. The knowledge and skills which are relevant
to diversifying acquisitions are largely associated with the CEO's general managerial knowl-
edge and skills. Thus, we argue that unrelated acquisitions can benefit from CEOs with a
broad set of managerial knowledge and skills that is not specific to a particular industry,
firm, or domain (i.e., from generalist CEOs).
In contrast, an acquisition is usually considered a related acquisition if the target
operates in the same industry as the acquirer. In such acquisitions, the acquirer and target
are typically more similar in terms of their products, markets, or technology than in
unrelated acquisitions, and the pursuit of operational synergies is an important factor in
related acquisitions (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). At
the CEO level, related acquisitions benefit from greater knowledge about the firm and
industry as the CEO of the acquirer needs to be able to assess the complementarities and
overlap between the capabilities and resources of the acquirer and those of potential targets
within the industry to facilitate the selection of an appropriate target. Further, related
acquisitions are typically associated with higher levels of integration between the acquirer
and target following the acquisition since one of the chief concerns in related acquisitions
is the creation of operational synergies which may require greater interdependence between
the companies (see also Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Zollo &
Singh, 2004). In related acquisitions, top managers thus need to be very familiar with the
resources and capabilities of their own firm to better understand how to integrate the
resources and capabilities of the target with their own. Hence, related acquisitions benefit
from a CEO's better knowledge of the firm and industry, and a broader set of managerial
knowledge and skills may have a relatively lower impact on the value creation in such
acquisitions. Thus, related acquisitions may benefit relatively less from generalist CEOs and
relatively more from specialist CEOs.
As argued above, CEOs are more likely to engage in strategic actions that correspond to
their own human capital profiles, and the appropriate deployment of their human capital to
strategic initiatives that match the nature of their human capital is more likely to lead to greater
performance than its deployment to initiatives that do not correspond to the nature of their
human capital. Thus, we propose the following two related hypotheses:
Hypothesis (H2). Conditional on their engaging in an acquisition, generalist CEOs are more
likely to engage in unrelated acquisitions than specialist CEOs.
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Hypothesis (H3). Acquisition performance is better if there is fit between the nature of the CEO's
human capital and the type of acquisitions the CEO engages in (i.e., generalist CEOs engag-
ing in unrelated acquisitions and specialist CEOs engaging in related acquisitions) than if
there is no fit (i.e., generalist CEOs engaging in related acquisitions and specialist CEOs
engaging in unrelated acquisitions).
3 | THE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR TWO-SIDED MATCHING
IN CEO RESEARCH
Since Hambrick and Mason (1984) published their seminal work, there has been a surge of
studies examining the effect of CEO and top management team characteristics on organiza-
tional choices and outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2018). This line of research typi-
cally examines the association between CEO characteristics and various firm-level strategic
decisions and outcomes (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 2013;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Yet, drawing causal inferences about the impact of CEOs in observa-
tional data is challenging because empirical testing can be affected by potential endogeneity
problems. The most salient source of endogeneity is that of “confounders”—factors that affect
both the appointment of CEOs with the characteristics of interest and the outcomes of interest,
but that may be unaccounted for in the analysis.2 For instance, executives may be drawn to and
promoted in contexts that fit their expertise (Chen & Hambrick, 2012), such as when certain
types of firms (e.g., firms with a diversified R&D program) hire certain types of CEOs
(e.g., executives with a science degree). In such a situation, it is plausible that the CEO pursues
strategies aligned with the firm's needs because of the context-CEO fit and not because of the
CEO's characteristics and preferences. Thus, even if a strategy mirrors the CEO's characteristics,
such an effect may not be driven by the CEO profile (which is the argument of upper echelons
theory), but simply because CEOs implement strategies that are aligned with firm attributes
and with the mandate given to them by the board (Hambrick, 2007). For instance, in our exam-
ple, if the CEO announces a new technological direction for the firm, this may be explained by
the firm's ability to deploy existing knowledge in a new area and the board's desire to go on this
path, and not by the CEO's science degree. What makes things more complicated is that execu-
tives' ability to carry out a strategy may depend on or be reinforced by the type of firm she man-
ages. Thus, firm-related factors may constitute alternative explanations for either the
appointment of CEOs, the differential performance of CEOs in firms, the outcomes under
examination, or all of these. If these firm-related factors are not modeled in the analysis both
directly and via their interaction with CEO attributes (or are unobservable to the researcher),
the estimation of the effect of CEO attributes is subject to selection bias and may lead to incor-
rect conclusions. At the root of these endogeneity problems is the nonrandom selection of the
treatment: CEOs are not appointed randomly by firms.
Estimating unbiased coefficients requires econometric methods that account for selection.
In panel data, scholars often use CEO-firm fixed effects to control for unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of the CEO-firm match (Custódio et al., 2019). However, this approach
limits the estimation of the effects of CEO characteristics to within-CEO-firm variation in the
CEO characteristic(s) of interest, and researchers still need to consider the possibility that the
2Our discussion here is not meant to be an exhaustive review of endogeneity issues in CEO research but a description of
the most salient issues. Endogeneity can have other roots which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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within-firm changes in CEO type may not be exogenous. Beyond fixed effects, the available
methods aim to directly tackle the endogeneity of firms' decision to appoint CEOs of a certain
type. One solution is to collect data where the assignment of CEOs to firms is known to be exog-
enous, such as changes in laws or death events (Shi, Hoskisson, & Zhang, 2017). Here, the iden-
tification of causal effects of executive influence is done via a difference-in-differences analysis.
The main constraints to the implementation of this approach arise from finding appropriate
exogenous shocks that generate enough observations. Another solution is to use the Heckman
two-step method, which requires researchers to directly model the selection of subjects into the
treatment group (see e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2011). As often noted, the main challenge of
using the Heckman method is the difficulty in finding valid instruments (Wolfolds &
Siegel, 2019). Studies have also used statistical matching techniques such as PSM and coarsened
exact matching (CEM) to address endogeneity (e.g., Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2020; Connelly,
Shi, & Zyung, 2017). The CEO characteristic being examined plays the role of a “treatment” or
an “intervention.” The statistical matching methodology generally aims to create a treatment
and a control group that are as similar as possible on a set of observable relevant characteristics
other than the treatment variable (Guo & Fraser, 2010). Although matching techniques reduce
the imbalance in the covariates between the treated and control groups, the endogeneity prob-
lem may persist if the matching variables do not absorb all outcome-relevant heterogeneity
between groups.
Fundamentally, all these approaches propose corrective measures to make observational
data become more akin to experimental data, wherein randomization ensures that the assign-
ment of the units of observation into the treatment conditions (treatment vs. nontreatment) is
independent of the potential outcomes, conditional on observable covariates. This property,
known as the ignorable treatment assignment assumption (also referred to as conditional inde-
pendence, unconfoundedness, selection on observables, or simply, exogeneity) is key to the sta-
tistical exploration of causal effects. However, it is not possible to directly test if the treatment
assignment that gave rise to the observed data is “ignorable” (Guo & Fraser, 2010). The tenabil-
ity of this causality condition in observational studies remains subject to how convincingly
researchers rule out potential sources of differential selection into the treatment conditions
(Roberts & Whited, 2013). In particular, researchers have cautioned against merely using a
broad range of variables as controls or matching covariates in the hope that some of those will
be highly correlated with the true confounders (Steiner, Cook, Shadish, & Clark, 2010).
Ultimately, the performance of methods designed to mitigate the endogeneity bias caused by
non-ignorable selection depends more on the identification of the right covariates—including
potential confounders—based on theoretical and empirical grounds than on a mechanical
application of technical solutions.
However, the choice of the variables to predict the treatment variable in the first stage in
these methods (and the definition of controls in the second stage) is often poorly guided or
sometimes highly subjective, which undermines the efficacy of these methods. Further, and
more important, the mainstream methods that have been used to address the selection of CEOs
into firms (PSM, CEM, the Heckman two-step selection method) aim to identify the effect of
CEO characteristics independently of the attributes of the firm, and they largely ignore the
potential interaction and complementarities between CEO and firm attributes.
In this paper, we embrace the view that addressing the endogeneity problems in the studies
that aim to assess how CEO attributes affect firm outcomes calls for a theoretical and economet-
ric solution for the identification of sorting patterns of CEOs into firms. Sorting, defined as a
market-wide outcome where social and economic agents form discrete groupings according to
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their choices, can be the result of self-selection if agents make unilateral decisions regarding
which “category” to belong to (see, e.g., Belenzon & Schankerman, 2015, on sorting in open
source innovation). Alternatively, it can be the result of a process where bilateral or multi-sided
preferences interact and constrain the choices of participating agents. CEO hiring falls squarely
in the latter category (Gabaix & Landier, 2008; Pan, 2017; Tervio, 2008). A firm's ability to
recruit its most preferred candidate depends on its choice set (i.e., the set of candidates willing
to join the firm) and is constrained by the willingness of other firms to extend a more attractive
offer to the same individual. It is the interaction of preferences and choices made by all other
firms and candidates competing in the process of filling a position that determines who
hires whom.
If firms were unilaterally able to hire the CEO of their choice, their preferences for a certain
CEO type could be estimated using discrete choice methods such as logit and probit variants
used in PSM or CEM. However, these methods cannot accommodate rival and interdependent
choices, and if applied to such situations may lead to wrong inferences altogether (Akkus,
Cookson, & Hortacsu, 2016; Mindruta et al., 2016). Studying the impact of CEOs' characteristics
thus calls for an empirical strategy that embeds the distinctive features of the CEO labor market
and provides an econometric solution for the identification of two-sided sorting patterns of
CEOs into firms.
The standard theoretical framework that accommodates these features of CEO hiring has
been developed in the literature that analyses hiring processes through the lenses of formal
matching models. Within this literature, Fox's (2010, 2018) maximum score estimator provides
an econometric solution to the identification problem that appears in the context of multi-sided,
multi-dimensional market sorting. We adopt this approach here.3 As we will explain in more
detail, the estimator allows us to exploit the information revealed by the outcome of CEO-firm
matching—that is, the sorting of CEOs into firms—to uncover the underlying set of attributes
that participants have perceived as jointly relevant to the mutual selection process that led to
hiring. Building on this analysis, we then lay out an empirical strategy that takes into account
the drivers of CEO-firm matching when testing hypotheses on how CEO human capital shapes
firm outcomes.
4 | DATA, MEASURES, AND BASELINE ANALYSIS
4.1 | Data
We sourced data on CEO human capital from the CEO General Ability Index data provided by
Custódio et al. (2013), which cover U.S. S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2007. We merged these
data with corporate financial data from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). We then used the Securities Data Company (SDC) database to gather details on
all firms' M&A deals within this sample frame,4 and used BoardEx and Capital IQ to gather
3The first application of the estimator to the labor market of senior executives (including CEOs) is by Pan (2017) and it
examines how sorting influences executive compensation. See Black (2019), Shelef and Nguyen-Chyung (2015), and
Honoré and Ganco (forthcoming) for other estimation approaches to two-sided matching.
4Following Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), we included acquisitions: (a) that had been completed; (b) in which the
acquirer controlled less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the announcement and 100% of the target's shares after
the transaction; and (c) in which the deal value exceeded US $1 million.
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data on the human capital of each firm's board members.5 The final sample used to test H1 at
the firm-year level comprised 7,782 observations, while the final sample used to test H2 and
H3 at the deal-year level comprised 1,723 observations.
4.2 | Measures
4.2.1 | Dependent variables
We used different dependent variables to test our hypotheses. To test H1, we defined Acquisi-
tiveness as the number of acquisitions a firm engaged in during a given year. To test H2, we cre-
ated two measures to capture whether the acquisitions a firm engaged in were unrelated
acquisitions, conditional on the firm engaging in an acquisition in the given year. First, we mea-
sured whether the firm had engaged in any unrelated acquisitions in that year (D(Diversify)).
Second, we measured the number of unrelated acquisitions (Num Diversify) that a firm engaged
in, in a given year. For both measures, we considered an unrelated acquisition to be one not in
the acquirer's primary industry (measured at the SIC 2-digit level). We also ran robustness
checks with relatedness measured at the SIC 4-digit level and using an alternative measure of
relatedness based on Coff (1999); our inferences remained the same. To test H3, we captured
acquisition performance as the abnormal announcement return over various windows. CAR
[x,y] is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) measured over day x to day y where day 0 is the
announcement date of the acquisition.6 CARs reflect the market's sentiment and assessment of
an acquisition at the time of the acquisition announcement, and they are widely used as a mea-
sure of acquisition performance.
4.2.2 | Independent variables
Our main independent variable is Generalist CEO, which was measured based on the Custódio
et al. (2013) CEO General Ability Index. It captures the extent to which a CEO has a broad set
of knowledge and skills and is obtained by considering five aspects of his or her professional
career: (a) The number of past positions the CEO has held during his or her career, (b) the
number of firms the CEO has worked for in his or her career, (c) the number of industries in
which a CEO has worked during his or her career, (d) whether the CEO has held a CEO posi-
tion at a different firm (captured by a dummy variable), and (e) whether the CEO has worked
for a conglomerate during his or her career (captured by a dummy variable). The first three
indicators are continuous variables with higher scores suggesting that a CEO has a broader set
of managerial knowledge and skills. The last two indicators are measured by dummy variables
with a value of 1 indicating a CEO holds a broader set of knowledge and skills, and 0 otherwise.
5As we required prior career information on all directors of the board to capture and control for their level of general
managerial knowledge and skills, our main analysis excluded observations where at least one director's prior career
information was missing. Results remained robust when these observations were included in the analysis and the
missing data in these observations were replaced with the sample-mean of the board human-capital variable, alongside
a missing data dummy indicator.
6The benchmark model is a market model with a value-weighted market index; its parameters are estimated from day
−230 to day −30.
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Using principal component analysis, these five factors were combined into a single measure
that proxied for the CEO's knowledge and skill set (Custódio et al., 2013). We conducted a robust-
ness check to ensure that any combination of four components or any one component would lead
to comparable results; this is discussed in the robustess check section. Like Custódio et al. (2013),
we then divided the CEOs into two categories, specialist and generalist, by creating the dummy
variable Generalist CEO, which was coded as 1 if a CEO's general managerial knowledge and
skills measure was above the median for all CEOs, and 0 otherwise. We used a dichomotomous
variable (Generalist CEO) rather than a continuous variable to test our hypothesis for two reasons:
First, our test of H3 required a dichotomization of CEOs into categories in order to create a fit var-
iable. Second, our Generalist CEO measure was based on Custódio et al. (2013), who dichoto-
mized their variable; our use of this variable was thus consistent with theirs.
It is important to note that at the CEO level, there is an inherent trade-off between the
broader set of managerial knowledge and skills gained by having worked in multiple domains,
firms, or industries and the more specialized human capital gained through longer tenure in a
particular domain, firm, or industry. Further, given that CEOs typically accumulate a substan-
tial amount of experience before they become CEOs (Schoar & Zuo, 2017), a CEO with a low
measure of general managerial knowledge and skills will have a human capital profile that is
more specialized in a particular domain, industry, or firm, especially when keeping the age of
the CEO constant. Indeed, our empirical analysis controlled for the age of the CEO; we also ran
a robustness check in which we adjusted the measure of the Generalist CEO by the CEO's age.
These efforts help to alleviate concerns that our analysis may be affected by measurement bias
in which a young CEO has a low level of general managerial knowledge and skills (because of
age and limited working experience) and a high level of specialized experience due to the
nature of our measure.7
To test H3, we created a dummy variable, Fit, coded as 1 if a generalist CEO engaged in an
unrelated acquisition or a specialist CEO engaged in a related acquisition, and 0 otherwise.
4.2.3 | Control variables
We included a comprehensive list of control variables. In all of our empirical tests, we con-
trolled for CEO age, CEO tenure, and whether the board was a Generalist board (using same
methodology as the Generalist CEO measure, based on the average knowledge and skills of
independent board members; Generalist board is a continuous measure). We controlled for CEO
prestige, which took the value of 1 if the CEO worked for an S&P 500 firm, and 0 otherwise
(Chen, Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008). Further, we controlled for Firm size (logged total assets)
and firm performance (Return on assets [ROA] and logged Tobin's Q), whether the firm was a
diversified firm (Multiple segments), or in a high-tech industry8 (High tech). We also included
7To futher alleviate this concern, notice the CEOs in our sample had an average age of 56 (and were, on average,
48 years old when they became CEOs). Moreover, the chance of having an inexperienced CEO with a low level of
general managerial knowledge and skills has been further reduced by a trend in executive careers that suggests that
more recent generations of CEOs tend to have worked for more firms and industries, while older generations of CEOs
tend to have had longer tenures in the firms they worked for. For instance, even the youngest CEO in our sample, at
34 years of age, had held seven positions prior to becoming CEO. This trend introduced a conservative bias into our
analysis.
8Following Kile and Phillips (2009), the following SIC 3-digit industries were defined as high-tech industries: 283, 357,
366, 367, 382, 384, 481, 482, 489, 737, and 873.
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the firm's Free cash flow and Leverage ratio. We controlled for governance conditions, including
Board independence (outside director ratio), Board size (number of directors), Director ownership
(a dummy variable indicating that at least one director held more than 5% of shares), CEO dual-
ity (whether the CEO was also the board chair), and CEO ownership (the percentage of firm
shares held by the CEO). We also controlled for board diversity: Age diversity and Ethnicity




i , where s is the number
of categories and p the proportion of directors on a board that belongs to category i).9
We also controlled for several characteristics that might influence a board's approach to
acquisition decisions, including the average age of directors (Average age of board), the Number
of deals last year, the Average deal size last year (total value of all transactions in a given firm-
year, scaled by the annual sales of the acquirer), and the firm's prior acquisition experience
(Firm acq exp). Finally, we also included Year fixed effects and Industry fixed effects in all
models.10 We ran robustness checks with Firm fixed effects which we discuss in the robustness
checks section.
In our tests of H2 and H3, the level of analysis was the deal transaction, so in addition to
the above control variables, we added a list of binary controls capturing deal characteristics:
cash versus stock as means of payment (Cash deal), Tender offer (the bid involved a tender offer
to target shareholders), Target termination fee (there was a target termination fee included in
the takeover agreement), Poison pill (a poison pill had affected the bidder's acquisition attempt),
Competing bidder (one or more competing bidders), and Public target. Table A1 in the Appendix
provides an overview of the main variables used in our analysis.
4.3 | Results of the baseline analysis
Our baseline analysis tests the hypotheses based on simple regression analysis that does not
take into account the two-sided matching, but includes a wide range of controls and fixed
effects.11 As mentioned previously, given the significant endogeneity concerns arising out of the
sorting of CEOs into firms, we consider this analysis largely correlational. We conducted this
baseline analysis not only as a robustness check to our main two-sided matching analysis, but
also to highlight differences with our two-sided matching analysis which will be of interest
when evaluating the importance of the proposed method.
Model 1 of Table 1 presents the results of our analysis to test H1. The coefficient of General-
ist CEO is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.166; p = .011), providing support for H1,
suggesting that generalist CEOs are more acquisitive than specialist CEOs. Models 2 and 3 of
Table 1 present the results of our analysis to test H2. The dependent variable in Model 2 is Num
Diversify, and in Model 3 is D(Diversify). In both models, the coefficient of Generalist CEO is
9The age category for the computation of the board Age diversity variable was measured in terms of birth cohorts,
specifically 10-year periods starting in 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, and 1960. Ethnicity was coded using five categories:
Asian, Black/African-American (incl. Other), Caucasian, Hispanic/Latino, and Native American.
10We implemented industry fixed effects via the Fama–French industry classifications (Fama & French, 1997).
11To test H1, we used Poisson regression models because the dependent variable (Acquisitiveness) was a count variable.
To test H2, we used a logit model when the dependent variable was a binary variable, D(Diversify), and Poisson models
when the dependent variable was a count variable, Num Diversify. To test H3, we used OLS regression models because
the dependent variables used to test this hypothesis were continuous. Across all regression models the standard errors
were robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level.
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TABLE 1 Analysis to test H1 and H2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Acquisitiveness Num diversify D(diversify)
Generalist CEO 0.166 0.775 0.456
(.011) (.000) (.001)
Cash deal 0.035 0.389
(.595) (.004)
Tender offer 0.083 0.773
(.508) (.003)
Target termination fee −0.038 0.191
(.717) (.340)
Poison pill 0.152 0.034
(.181) (.815)
Competing bidder −0.859 −0.616
(.003) (.121)
Public target −0.206 −0.674
(.126) (.002)
Board independence −0.156 −0.305 −0.320
(.488) (.242) (.471)
Board size −0.039 −0.036 −0.032
(.033) (.086) (.323)
Director ownership −0.211 −0.325 −0.271
(.088) (.061) (.185)
Generalist board −0.349 0.579 0.860
(.238) (.180) (.066)
CEO duality −0.059 −0.230 0.174
(.410) (.067) (.248)
CEO ownership −0.010 −0.013 −0.016
(.218) (.429) (.399)
CEO age −0.001 −0.007 −0.018
(.909) (.527) (.114)
CEO tenure −0.007 −0.003 −0.001
(.306) (.774) (.945)
CEO prestige −0.074 0.117 0.107
(.407) (.366) (.523)
Ethnicity diversity −0.177 0.037 −0.019
(.331) (.881) (.957)
Age diversity −0.230 0.070 −0.676
(.375) (.889) (.258)
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positive and statistically significant (β = 0.775, p = .000 in Model 2; β = 0.456 p = .001 in Model
3), providing support for H2. The results suggest that, conditional on engaging in an acquisition,
generalist CEOs are more likely to engage in unrelated acquisitions than specialists.
In Table 2, we test H3, whether the fit between the nature of the CEO's human capital and
the type of acquisitions he or she engages in (generalist CEOs engaging in unrelated acquisi-
tions and specialist CEOs engaging in related acquisitions) is associated with stronger acquisi-
tion performance than the absence of fit (generalist CEOs engaging in related acquisitions and
specialist CEOs engaging in unrelated acquisitions). Panel A presents the univariate analysis
where we compare the means by group. Across different CAR time windows (CAR[−1, 1]; CAR
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Acquisitiveness Num diversify D(diversify)
Average age of board −0.005 0.039 0.040
(.605) (.007) (.046)
Deal size last year −0.033 −0.168 −0.268
(.343) (.333) (.141)
Number of deals last year 0.187 0.048 0.087
(.000) (.180) (.155)
Firm size 0.220 0.097 0.046
(.000) (.054) (.455)
Multiple segments 0.304 0.232 0.366
(.000) (.029) (.014)
Tobin's Q 0.161 0.322 0.085
(.068) (.026) (.668)
Free cash flow 1.107 −0.812 0.284
(.029) (.595) (.852)
ROA 0.077 −0.091 −0.060
(.796) (.214) (.613)
Leverage ratio 0.516 −0.466 0.042
(.017) (.237) (.939)
Firm acq exp 0.014 0.015 0.006
(.001) (.005) (.389)
High tech 0.249 −0.417 −0.784
(.139) (.067) (.013)
Constant −5.715 −4.401 −2.711
(.000) (.000) (.097)
Observations 7,782 1,723 1,723
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses; SE are clustered at the firm level.
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[−2, 2]) we find that if there is fit between the nature of the CEO's human capital and the type
of acquisitions he or she engages in, the acquisitions the CEO engages in generate positive
CARs on average; if there is no fit, the acquisitions the CEO engages in generate negative CARs
on average. The difference in CAR is statistically significant across the two groups. Panel B pre-
sents the results of the multivariate regression analysis, and across different CAR time windows
we find consistent support for H3, suggesting that the fit between the nature of the CEO's
human capital and the type of acquisitions he or she engages in is associated with stronger
acquisition performance (CAR[−1,1]: β = .006, p = .015; CAR[−2,2]: β = .005, p = .090; CAR
[−20;20]: β = .013, p = .080).12
5 | TWO-SIDED MATCHING: ASSUMPTIONS,
ESTIMATION, MODELS, AND RESULTS
We now turn to examine whether generalist CEOs sort into firms whose characteristics support
or reinforce the acquisition behavior or outcomes discussed in our hypotheses. Sorting in two-
sided matching markets can create endogeneity problems to the extent that the interaction of
TABLE 2 Analysis to test H3
Panel A univariate analysis
[1] [2] [2]–[1]
Not fit Fit p-value
CAR[−1,1] −0.27% 0.35% .002
CAR[−2,2] −0.12% 0.58% .004
Panel B multivariate analysis
(1) CAR[−1,1] (2) CAR[−2,2] (3) CAR[−20,20]
Fit 0.006 0.005 .013
(.015) (.090) (.080)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,723 1,723 1,723
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses; Panel B contains the same set of control variables as Model 3 in Table 1. SE are clustered at the
firm level.
12It is important to note that a diversifying acquisition is an acquisition of a target firm that operates in a different
industry from the acquirer. If an acquirer wants to acquire a firm in an industry that is distant from its industry and
wants to hire a new CEO to pursue this strategy, our results in support of H2 and H3 above do not necessarily suggest
that the firm hires a specialist CEO with highly specialized expertise in that distant industry before diversifying into that
industry. Instead, our results are more consistent with the view that the firm would hire a generalist CEO (who had
some experience in that distant industry) before entering the distant industry.
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CEO attributes and firm characteristics are captured by the error term instead of being con-
trolled for in the analysis.13 To address these issues, we use the maximum score estimator, a sta-
tistical method developed to estimate the underlying drivers of match formation (Fox, 2010,
2018) in a large class of matching processes, namely those involving monetary transfers among
parties. This approach will allow us to subsequently account for CEO-firm complementarities
in our hypothesis testing. We begin by discussing the key features of the formal matching
models that lie behind the estimation and the main assumptions that researchers must decide if
they hold in their data. For a full technical discussion we refer readers to Fox (2010, 2018). We
then describe and apply the estimator in the context of CEO-firm matching. Lastly, we exploit
the information revealed by the maximum score estimator to refine our inferences about the
role of CEO human capital in shaping firm acquisition strategies and performance.
5.1 | Main assumptions and estimation of two-sided matching models
We assume that firms only hire one CEO at a time and our exposition refers to a model of one-
to-one matching. Matching can be multi-sided and the estimator can handle such situations
(see e.g., Fox, 2018). While in the empirical application we focus on generalist versus specialist
CEOs, below we refer to CEOs in more general terms.
Consider N the number of open positions in a given market; Xi = (xi
1, xi
2,…, xim), i {1,..,N}
the bundle of m attributes that describe CEO i's quality (such as reputation, experience, age,
etc.); and Yj = (yj
1, yj
2,…, yjk), j  {1,..,N}, the bundle of k attributes that describe firm j's quality
(such as size, financial standing, industry sectors, etc.). Both sides, CEOs and firms, are inher-
ently heterogenous. The joint value created by any given {CEOi (Xi), Firmj (Yj)} pairing, denoted
by v(Xi, Yj), depends directly on the “fit” between the attributes Xi of the CEOi and attributes Yj
of the Firmj. Below, we use an identical index to indicate that agents are matched (e.g., CEOi
and Firmi are matched and we denote by {i,i} their pairing) and different indices otherwise.
The specification of the joint value function is a key step in the estimation. The goal is to
understand which of the CEO and firm attributes matter jointly for their matching. As discussed
in other papers (Mindruta, 2013; Pan, 2017) and dating back to Milgrom and Roberts (1995),
the mathematical notion of complementarity (and the substitution counterpart) provides a for-
mal definition for the idea of “fit” or synergy between matched agents. The sign of the cross-
partial derivative of the value function with respect to combinations of attributes xm  X and yk
 Y indicates if the attributes are complements (positive sign) or substitutes (negative sign).
Our exposition focuses on explaining how the estimator identifies these relationships. We will
also explain the connection between complementarity/substitutability and sorting.
13For instance, if large firms value the knowledge breadth of generalist CEOs more than the focused experience of
specialist CEOs and if generalist CEOs themselves value large firms because they can apply their knowledge more
productively in larger rather than smaller organizations, then, on the whole, and absent other considerations, we can
expect generalist CEOs to manage larger firms. Now, suppose also that large firms tend to make more (unrelated)
acquisitions. If the role of firm size is not modeled, the estimate of the (average treatment effect of the) CEO generalist
variable in the acquisition outcome regression will be biased upwards. Further, it is plausible that CEO generalists have
a larger impact on firm acquisition behavior at larger firms or even that their impact is conditional on working at larger
firms (giving rise to a heterogenous treatment effect). The concern in these situations is that the estimate of CEO impact
on the acquisition outcomes reflects the match between generalist CEOs and firm size (and their associated
complementarity) and not the true effect of CEO human capital, as previously hypothesized.
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The joint value v(Xi, Yj) can be decomposed in two parts: c(Xi, Yj), the compensation (salary
and other perquisites) the CEOi receives from the Firmj, and p(Xi, Yj), the private payoff that is







Given that CEOs and firms are heterogenous in their attributes, not all pairings create the
same value. Thus, participants on the same side of the market—executives and firms,
respectively—compete among each other to be in a more valuable match. A match between
CEOi (Xi) and Firmi (Yi) occurs when the firm is not willing to pay the compensation required
to attract a different executive and the executive is not willing to accept the compensation
offered by a different firm. Formally, this means that the market-level structure of CEO-firm
pairings observed in the data (i.e., the assignment of CEOs to firms) is pairwise stable: the value
generated by any potential pairing of unmatched agents is less than or equal to the payoffs
received by agents in their current match. Take two observed matches indexed {i,i} and {j,j} and










+p Xi,Yið Þ ð3Þ
An interesting feature of the matching equilibrium makes the connection between the
sorting patterns in the market and the drivers of joint value. As shown by Becker (1973), in
one-to-one matching situations, any two attributes xm  X and yk  Y that are complementary
inputs in the joint value function v will lead to positive assortative matching, or a top-down
sorting along these dimensions (e.g., assuming that CEOs and firms are each characterized by
one attribute only—xm and yk, respectively—then we will observe CEOs and firms ranking sim-
ilarly along these dimensions forming a match). Conversely, any two attributes xm and yk that
are substitute inputs in the joint value function will lead to negative assortative matching
(e.g., the executive ranking highest on xm will match with the firm ranking lowest on yk, the
executive ranking second highest on xm will match with the firm ranking second lowest on yk,
etc.). However, there is no general characterization of the sorting patterns in the data when
agents match on multiple dimensions, some being complements and others being substitutes.
As we will see below, the estimator can recover, ceteris paribus, the nature of the relationship
(complementarity vs. substitution) between any two attributes entering the value function and
the relative importance of the relationship to matching. The following assumptions are
being made:
Assumption 1. The CEO-firm pairings observed in the data are the equilibrium outcome of a
matching process.
In our context, we will assume that CEO hiring is a two-sided matching process that gener-
ates the observed appointment of CEOs to firms in the data. Based on this assumption, defini-
tion (1) and relationships (2) and (3) yield the following inequality:
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Relationship (4), known as the local value maximization condition, is at the core of the estima-
tion procedure. As we have shown above, this condition is satisfied by any pairwise stable assign-
ment. Intuitively, it stipulates that if we draw randomly any two CEO-firm matches observed in
the data, then switching partners across pairs would not lead to higher value (otherwise, CEOs
and firms would have sorted differently and been better off). Maximum score estimator exploits
this inequality between the value created by observed matches and counterfactual pairings to
identify the joint value creation function v(X, Y). Fox (2010) provides the proofs for identification
proof and Fox (2018) for consistency. Notice that the estimator does not require calculating an
equilibrium outcome and does not require information on CEO compensation, even if this is sub-
sumed in the process and built into the model. Because it relies on inequalities, the estimator does
not require observing the value per se, but just the right-hand side of the regression.
The empirical counterpart of the theoretical match value v(Xi, Yj) is the match production
function f (Xi, Yjj β) that we aim to estimate, where β denotes the vector of parameters of inter-
est. The deterministic part of the match production function П (Xi, Yj) can take the form of a






Notice that preferences over whom to match with appear in the equation under П (Xi, Yj),
as characteristics that both sides perceive as being relevant in combination. The terms ξXi and
ξYj indicate CEO and firm fixed effects, respectively. These are attributes observed by partici-
pants but not necessarily by the econometrician. The term εij captures the match-specific error
(or the private value of a pairing). The following additional assumptions must hold:
Assumption 2a. εij are i.i.d. and independent of all Xi, Yj, ξXi, ξYj.
Assumption 2b. The fixed effects of agents on one side of the market are not correlated with
the observable characteristics of agents on the other side: corr (Xi,ξYj) = 0; corr (Yj, ξXi) = 0.
Assumption 2a means that the estimator does not impose a distribution on the error terms but
relies on the standard assumption that the error term is independent of the other covariates in the
model. Assumption 2b states that any unobserved characteristics that may characterize agents on
one side of the market are not part of the bilateral preferences for matching. Thus, the estimator is
robust to fixed effects, although they are not estimated. Indeed, the terms ξXi, ξYj cancel out when
replacing v(Xi, Yj) by f (Xi, Yjj β) in the local maximization condition (4), and we have:






More generally, the method estimates only bilateral preferences via interaction terms and
not independent, one-sided characteristics that may affect the value of the match. Furthermore,
because any positive monotonic transformation of the value function will satisfy the local maxi-
mization condition, the scale of the production function (5) cannot be identified. A standard
approach in the literature is to set the value of one element of the vector β to be equal to ±1.
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When applied to all matches observed in the data, relationship (6) yields a system of inequal-
ities. In practice, data can come either from a large market or from multiple independent mar-
kets. Coefficient estimates are those that maximize the total number of inequalities across all










   ð7Þ
where 1[.] is an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if the inequality in the bracket is
true, h is a market index taking value from 1 up to M (the total number of markets observed in
the data), and Nh denotes the number of matches observed in a market h. Because the score
function is a step function, computing its maximum requires using specific numerical optimiza-
tion routines, such as differential evolution or simulated annealing (Fox, 2018). The significance
is assessed by examining the confidence intervals of the estimates via subsampling techniques.
5.2 | Specification of CEO-firm two-sided matching
The estimator allows us to directly test which sets of CEO-firm attributes are complements in
the CEO-firm matching function against the null alternative that an interaction term between
CEO and firm attributes does not act as a significant driver of their matching. We are particu-
larly interested in the firm-level attributes that may be complementary to the generalist CEO
dimension. While the prior literature has not addressed this question directly, we draw upon
relevant studies to argue that firm size, firm diversification, firm acquisition experience, and a
board whose members' human capital type is similar to that of the CEO may enhance the value
of generalist CEOs, who in turn will prefer managing firms with such capabilities. Indeed,
larger firms and diversified firms typically involve more complex operations, coordination, and
decisions (e.g., Aggarwal, 1981; Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Michel & Hambrick, 1992),
and CEOs with broad knowledge may be more valuable to and prefer working for such firms
(Pan, 2017). Furthermore, the prior acquisition experience of the firm is more likely to be rele-
vant to executives who aim to engage in acquisitions because this experience enables organiza-
tional routines that are more consistent with executive cognitive styles in implementing the
acquisition strategy (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Finally, generalist boards
are more likely to hire generalist CEOs because of social preference and homophily effects
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1996); and likewise, it is easier for
these CEOs to align their strategic preference with a board whose members also have a broader
domain of knowledge. We thus expect complementarity between a generalist CEO and a gener-
alist board.14
14In performing this analysis, we started from a theoretically-informed specification that we deemed relevant to the
discussion of how the sorting of generalist CEOs into firms may affect the relationships hypothesized in H1 and H2. As
a robustness check, we performed additional tests in which we included, one at a time, other firm performance
measures (ROA; Altman's Z score; free cash flow) and board characteristics (age and ethnicity diversity). On the CEO
side we also considered education prestige (MBA or Ivy League degree) and tenure within the firm as these are typical
characteristics that firms may consider when making a hiring decision (Chen & Hambrick, 2012; Finkelstein
et al., 2009). None of these considerations were significant.
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Beyond the knowledge- and experience-related aspects of CEO human capital, the literature
suggests that a dominant characteristic of the executive labor market is the sorting of more pres-
tigious and talented CEOs into larger and more performant firms (D'Aveni, 1990; Gabaix &
Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008). We thus include in the matching function two additional interac-
tion terms, with CEO prestige variable on one side and firm size and firm performance (Tobin's
Q) on the other side. Further, another dimension of possible CEO-firm “fit” involves executive
age and firm risk profile. Older CEOs, being closer to retirement, are more likely to prefer situa-
tions posing lower cognitive challenges (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Matta & Beamish, 2008) and
lower risk (such as firms with lower R&D investments), and they are therefore more likely to
select themselves out of firms operating in high-tech industries.15
To run the estimator, we need to define the matching markets that are relevant to our setting.
Following conventional wisdom, we consider firms in the same main industry and hiring in the
same year to be in more direct competition for CEOs than other firms, and we define as a
“matching market” all hiring events taking place in an industry-year. This definition strikes a good
balance between the risk of including irrelevant comparisons in the score function (7) and the risk
of too narrow assumptions about who competes with whom. We observed 775 hiring events and
55 markets in the data. The local maximization condition yields 5,131 inequalities. To maximize
the score function (7), we use the differential evolution maximization method in Mathematica.16
5.3 | The identification of complementarities in the
CEO-firm match
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates produced by the maximum-score estimator. Only inter-
action terms are estimated: CEO and firm attributes and the fixed effects drop out in equilib-
rium (see relationship (6) above), as matching is driven, by definition, by the combination of
the two sides' attributes. There is systematic empirical evidence in the prior literature that CEO
prestige and firm size are strong determinants of executive-firm matching (Gabaix &
Landier, 2008; Tervio, 2008) and we use the interaction between these two variables serves as a
scale normalization. We set this coefficient to +1 because, as expected, the positive value +1 sat-
isfies more inequalities than −1. Overall, the model fits well, and 81.5% of inequalities are satis-
fied. To test the significance of the estimates, we generated 95% confidence intervals by drawing
subsamples of 22 markets over 1,500 rounds.
Interestingly, the estimates show that the only firm attribute that enhances the value of a
CEO generalist is the nature of the human capital of the firm's board of directors; this suggests
that mutual preferences for homophily in the type of CEOs' and board directors' human capital
is a significant sorting dimension. When put to a stronger statistical test of multidimensional
matching, all other terms in the model where the generalist CEO attribute interacts with firm
attributes are small and insignificant. Specifically, we do not find that generalist CEOs sort into
larger firms or into firms operating in multiple segments or firms with prior experience with
15CEO prestige and Generalist CEO are dummy variables. We transformed CEO age into a dummy variable (over 55)
because it captures the idea of CEOs being close to retirement better than using a continuous variable, which would
imply a monotone linear relationship between age and the High tech firm dummy. When the continuous variable is
included in the model, the relationship CEO age*High tech firm is statistically significant but fewer inequalities are
satisfied. To facilitate the interpretation of results, we rescaled the Generalist board variable from 0 to 1 (from the lowest
to highest generalist board values in the sample). Results are robust to not rescaling.
16The code is provided by Jeremy Fox on his webpage: http://fox.web.rice.edu/.
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acquisitions. However, the statistical test shows that two other considerations are highly rele-
vant: more prestigious CEOs match with better performing firms (as measured by Tobin's Q),
and older CEOs are less attracted to and less valued by high-tech firms.
The relative importance of each relationship in the matching can be assessed by taking into
account differences in covariate variation in the sample. To this end, we multiplied each coeffi-
cient estimate by the ratio between the S.D. (standard deviation) of the corresponding covariate
and the S.D. of the baseline relationship (see the last two columns in Table 3). Strikingly, the
most important relationship is the baseline (CEO prestige*Firm size) and it dominates by far all
other sorting considerations. The variation in the generalist CEO–generalist board relationship
is roughly 8% as important in explaining the match value as the variation in the CEO prestige–
firm size relationship. The other two significant relationships have a comparable small impact
(9.7% for CEO prestige–Tobin's Q and 7.9% for CEO old–High tech firm).17











CEO prestige*firm size 1 Superconsistent 4.279 1
Generalist CEO*multiple
segments
0.029 {−0.486, 0.108} 1.322 0.009
Generalist CEO*firm acq exp 0.007 {−0.045, 0.030} 5.702 0.009
Generalist CEO*generalist
board
1.370 {0.874, 4.380} 0.245 0.079
Generalist CEO*firm size 0.130 {−0.017, 0.566} 4.123 0.125
CEO prestige*Tobin's Q 1.046 {0.255, 2.005} 0.397 0.097
CEO old (over 55)*high tech −0.965 {−4.864, −0.252} 0.352 −0.079
Statistical fit The model predicts 81.5% of 5,131 inequalities
Note: The percentage of satisfied inequalities (81.5%) is a measure of statistical fit. The 95% confidence intervals were obtained
by extracting subsamples of 22 markets (of the 55), over 1,500 rounds. The CEO prestige*firm size relationship serves to
normalize the scale and its coefficient is set to +1; the parameter estimate is superconsistent and there is no need to calculate a
confidence interval for this covariate. We applied the differential evolution method for maximization, using 150 initial points
chosen randomly in the search-space. We checked the robustness of results by re-running the maximization over 500 rounds,
each time starting from a random seed. The results across these runs maximized a very similar number of inequalities.
17Coefficients represent the cross-partial derivative of the match production function, with respect to the two attributes
in the corresponding covariate. As a reminder, for dummy variables, a unit increase means a change from 0 to 1. Firm
size and Tobin's Q are logged and a unit increase corresponds to one percent increase. A one unit increase (from 0 to 1)
in the Generalist board variable means a change from the least to the most generalist board in the sample. The scale of
the estimated production function is expressed in the hypothetical marginal unit of value created when a high-prestige
CEO (vs. a low-prestige CEO) is hired by a firm that is 1% larger. We will refer to this as the “unit value created by the
baseline.” Prior work by Tervio (2008) shows that it is economically significant. Accordingly, the interpretation of
estimates is that, ceteris paribus: (a) the marginal value created by a generalist CEO (relative to a specialist CEO) if
hired by the “most generalist” versus the “most specialist” board is 1.370 times larger than the unit value created by the
baseline; (b) the marginal value created by a high-prestige versus a low-prestige CEO when being hired by a firm that
has a 1% higher Q ratio is comparable to the value created by the baseline (i.e., the coefficient is 1.046); (c) the marginal
value destroyed when an older CEO (relative to a younger CEO) is matched with a high tech versus a non-high-tech
firm is only slightly lower, that is, 0.965 times smaller, than the unit value created by the baseline (we talk about value
being destroyed because the coefficient is negative).
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5.4 | Empirical strategy to account for two-sided matching in
hypotheses testing
We now turn to the consequences of the evidence on the complementarity between generalist
CEOs and generalist boards for our baseline analysis.18 The standard interpretation of the comple-
mentarity result is that a generalist CEO is more productive when joining a firm with a generalist
board than when joining an otherwise identical firm with a board that is more specialized. Gener-
alist CEOs join these firms because they anticipate support from generalist board members;
boards value the management style of generalist CEOs. The match increases the likelihood that
the management and the board converge toward a similar strategic direction. Under this interpre-
tation, the matching process corroborates our theory and hypotheses, as generalist CEOs pursue
strategies that are consistent with their ability and, in turn, are also endorsed by the board.
The validity of this interpretation rests on the premise that generalist CEOs would pur-
sue acquisitions consistent with their type of human capital, as hypothesized in H1 and
H2, even when acting independently of the board type (including in the presence of a less
generalist board). The ideal setting to disentangle the CEO-firm matching effects from the
impact of CEO characteristics is a random allocation of generalist CEOs across firms.
Absent such a setting, another complication is that we cannot create treatment and control
groups of firms that are similar in all relevant dimensions (including the matching comple-
mentarities) other than the treatment variable (Generalist CEO). Indeed, the relationship
that is most likely to confound our analysis (i.e., Generalist CEO matched with Generalist
board) contains the key independent variable (Generalist CEO) necessary to test H1/H2,
and thus it is not feasible to conduct a CEM or PSM analysis with all the complementar-
ities as predictors in the first stage.
To further probe our results in H1 and H2, we have taken an alternative approach that
exploits the multidimensionality of CEO-firm matching. Essentially, to the extent that CEO
prestige and age do not correlate perfectly with the CEO being a generalist in our sample (and
they do not!) and that generalist boards are not observed exclusively at large, profitable, or high
tech firms (and they are not!), there will be observations in the sample where considerations
other than the “generalist CEO–generalist board” complementarity have prevailed in the match
formation. For example, a generalist board in a high-tech firm faces a trade-off between
selecting a more generalist CEO and a younger executive. Importantly, there are no theoretical
reasons to believe that these other matching considerations, found to be significant in our
empirical analysis, are likely to confound the effects of generalist CEOs on firm acquisition
behavior. The multidimensionality of matching thus creates enough variation in the sample,
which we use to tackle the question of whether CEO generalists still make choices consistent
with our predictions in H1 and H2 even when not matched perfectly with firms whose board
directors are themselves generalists.
We performed this analysis by splitting the sample into two subsamples, those observations
with generalist board values above the median and those with generalist board values below the
median. We re-ran the baseline analysis in these subsamples to examine whether generalists were
more likely than specialists to pursue the hypothesized acquisition strategy in firms with different
18The results of the main analysis continue to indicate a significant CEO generalist effect when baseline regressions are
re-run to include the interaction terms describing CEO-firm complementarities. However, in a two-sided market, it is
incorrect to interpret the interaction terms from a simple regression as complementarities. As explained, these can be
identified only via an analysis that follows the theoretical constraints imposed by interdependent choices.
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types of boards. Of particular interest is the behavior of generalist CEOs in firms whose boards had
lower generalist values, because here the synergy between the CEO and firm in the dimension of
“generalist CEO–generalist board” was lower. Apart from the prior controls, we also included in
the regression the other complementarities identified in the two-sided matching analysis.
To the extent that CEO-firm complementarities affect the value-creation potential of
strategic initiatives, such as pursuing unrelated acquisitions, we also need to examine the
degree to which CEO-firm matching drives the results in H3. To address this problem, we
conducted a PSM analysis that used the identified complementarities from the two-sided
matching analysis as predictors of our independent variable underlying H3 (Fit between the
nature of the CEO's human capital and the type of acquisition the CEO engages in). Rela-
tive to CEM, which can restrict the number of variables to be matched on in the first
stage, PSM analysis allows us to include all theoretically relevant variables. We conducted
two types of PSM analyses. Both included all control variables (from Model 1 in Table 2)
and industry fixed effects as the predictor variables of Fit in the first stage and as
covariates of Fit in the second stage. In the first scenario, we added as a predictor the
CEO-firm match value generated by the two-sided matching analysis (see definition [5] in
Section 5.1). In the second scenario, we added the four complementarities identified in the
two-sided matching analysis (as well as the Generalist CEO dummy because one of the
four-complementarity interactions included that dummy).19 The PSM analysis enabled us to
create a matched sample in which the treatment and control observations were similar in
terms of their observable characteristics, including the CEO-firm complementarities.
5.5 | Results of our hypotheses testing when accounting for two-sided
matching
The results of our tests of H1 and H2 accounting for the complementarities identified in the
two-sided matching are presented in Table 4. Models 1 and 2 indicate that, indeed, CEO gener-
alists are more likely to pursue a higher number of acquisitions only if they work at firms with
higher generalist boards. Further, the Generalist board variable (measured as a continuous
score) is negative in the subsample where it takes values above the median and not significant
in the subsample where it takes values below the median. Thus, while it is unlikely that the
board type alone would drive the results in H1, the complementarity with the board appears to
be important in prompting generalist CEOs to engage in acquisitions. This analysis suggests
that our hypothesized effect in H1 is potentially confounded by the systematic sorting of CEOs
into firms. Further, regarding H2, in Models 3–6, the Generalist CEO variable remains highly
significant in all specifications across the Generalist board subsamples. The Generalist board
variable (measured as a continuous score) is also insignificant in three out of four models. The
results suggest that the Generalist CEO dummy is significant above and beyond the board
effects—even in the subsample of generalist boards below the median. This lends support to the
idea that generalist CEOs pursue unrelated acquisitions, irrespective of board type.
The results of our PSM analysis and our tests of H3 accounting for the complementarities
identified in the two-sided matching are presented in Table 5. Panel A highlights that treatment
19For both PSM analyses, we used 1:1 matching with replacement and only retained observations on the common
support.
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and control observations are similar along all complementarities, alongside the propensity
score, and alongside almost all other control variables. Panel B shows that H3 holds in the
matched sample, even when controlling for the overall value of CEO-firm match and for CEO-
firm complementarities. This analysis provides evidence that our results underlying H3 are
unlikely to be driven by the systematic sorting of CEOs into firms.
As we have shown above, the tests based on the two-sided matching analysis provide evi-
dence that alleviates some of the concerns that the sorting of CEOs into firms may bias our
inferences. Another problem arises from the possibility that an unobserved firm characteristic
may both attract generalists to the CEO positions in firms and cause (unrelated) acquisitions to
happen and create greater value. The maximum score analysis relies on observable (to the
researcher) matching attributes and cannot completely rule out this concern (but see Fox, Yang
and Hsu (2018) for recent work on the identification of the distribution of unobservables in
matching games).







board High generalist board Low generalist board














Generalist CEO 0.171 0.039 0.677 0.505 0.757 0.424
(.037) (.697) (.000) (.015) (.000) (.031)
Generalist board −0.960 −0.654 0.534 1.030 1.348 0.628
(continuous
measure)
(.065) (.448) (.257) (.176) (.057) (.602)
Firm size*CEO
prestige
−0.129 −0.114 0.052 0.000 0.151 0.352
(.036) (.246) (.399) (.999) (.120) (.028)
High tech*CEO
old
0.225 −0.553 0.490 0.294 0.444 0.156
(.204) (.014) (.067) (.543) (.103) (.720)
Tobin's Q*CEO
prestige
0.180 0.325 0.267 −0.424 0.061 −0.150
(.357) (.197) (.301) (.325) (.859) (.749)
Constant −5.281 −6.627 −6.930 4.506 −12.683 −11.958
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.084) (.000) (.000)
Observations 3,983 3,799 863 863 860 860
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry and
year FEs
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses; SE are clustered at the firm level. Models 1 and 2 include the same control variables as
Model 1 in Table 1. Models 3–6 include the same control variables as Model 3 in Table 1. Across the models, we
controlled for CEO age through a CEO old dummy instead of the CEO age variable (the results were consistent when
controlling for the continuous CEO age variable).
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TABLE 5 PSM results based on complementarities identified in the two-sided matching models
Panel A matching quality
Control Treated p-value Control Treated p-value
Pscore 0.599 0.599 .990 0.611 0.611 .993
Cash deal 0.661 0.607 .014 0.627 0.607 .350
Tender offer 0.074 0.064 .371 0.067 0.065 .855
Target termination fee 0.243 0.229 .454 0.213 0.228 .443
Poison pill 0.578 0.565 .551 0.539 0.565 .253
Competing bidder 0.017 0.020 .609 0.014 0.021 .299
Public target 0.309 0.300 .657 0.271 0.300 .159
Board independence 0.683 0.687 .541 0.673 0.687 .049
Board size 10.198 10.381 .209 10.007 10.385 .011
Director ownership 0.086 0.082 .743 0.063 0.082 .114
Generalist board 0.410 0.408 .811 0.398 0.409 .186
CEO duality 0.683 0.670 .560 0.701 0.669 .129
CEO ownership 1.494 1.539 .809 1.738 1.531 .262
CEO old 55.131 55.120 .971 55.339 55.093 .456
CEO tenure 7.400 8.065 .025 8.139 8.014 .687
CEO prestige 0.341 0.331 .630 0.334 0.331 .885
Ethnicity diversity 0.292 0.305 .122 0.301 0.306 .570
Age diversity 0.587 0.585 .573 0.580 0.585 .371
Average age of board 59.259 59.283 .892 59.127 59.286 .383
Deal size last year 0.081 0.096 .478 0.057 0.085 .116
Number of deals last year 0.487 0.463 .647 0.479 0.467 .815
Firm size 8.410 8.394 .841 8.319 8.398 .346
Multiple segments 0.475 0.474 .964 0.471 0.473 .927
Tobin's Q 0.654 0.640 .550 0.642 0.640 .947
Free cash flow 0.058 0.056 .609 0.058 0.057 .612
ROA −2.888 −2.933 .268 −2.918 −2.932 .740
Leverage ratio 0.189 0.198 .161 0.202 0.198 .594
Firm acq exp 5.756 5.602 .756 5.708 5.717 .985
High tech 0.338 0.331 .736 0.345 0.331 .532
CEO-firm match value from
two-sided matching model
4.384 4.266 .620
Generalist CEO 0.408 0.422 .518
Firm size*CEO prestige 3.113 3.090 .913
High tech*CEO old 0.236 0.231 .788
Tobin 's Q*CEO prestige 0.249 0.240 .660
Generalist CEO*generalist board 0.202 0.211 .448
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6 | ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We conducted several robustness checks. First, we ran a robustness check in which we used a
continuous measure of Generalist CEO instead of a dichotomous variable. This analysis corrobo-
rated our results. Further, based on our dichotomous Generalist CEO variable, we also conducted
a robustness check in which we dropped each one of the five components of the Generalist CEO
index and were able to confirm our results. Similarly, we ran a robustness check in which we
based the Generalist CEO dummy on each of the five components, and the analysis was largely
consistent with our main findings.20 To mitigate the concern that our estimates were affected by
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Panel B. Test of H3 based on a matched sample
Model 1: CAR[−1,1] Model 2: CAR[−1,1]
Fit 0.008 0.013
(.000) (.000)




Firm size*CEO prestige −0.001
(.664)
High tech*CEO old −0.005
(.378)
Tobin's Q*CEO prestige 0.010
(.086)





Other controls Yes Yes
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses; standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Models 1 and 2 include the same control variables
as Model 3 in Table 1. In addition, Model 2 includes the Generalist CEO variable. In both Models 1 and 2, we control for CEO
age through a CEO old dummy instead of the CEO age variable (the results were consistent when controlling for the continuous
CEO age variable).
20In tests where the Generalist CEO dummy is based on one of the five index components, the coefficient of Generalist
CEO is always consistent with our prediction; in 5 of the 15 regressions, the coefficient is not significant at conventional
significance levels.
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extreme outliers in Acquisitiveness and Num Diversify, we winsorized these two measures at the
top 2 percentile. Our inferences were not affected. Second, our main analysis used industry fixed
effects and year fixed effects rather than firm fixed effects. While we observed mobility in the sam-
ple, using firm fixed effects could absorb some of the effect of the Generalist CEO variable. Thus,
we adopted the approach of not using firm fixed effects in our main analysis; instead, we ran a
robustness check with firm fixed effects. This analysis revealed that our results were fully
supported for H1 and H2 and remained qualitatively similar for H3. Third, in relation to H3, we
conducted a robustness check to examine whether one or both types of fit (generalist CEOs
engaging in unrelated acquisitions and specialist CEOs engaging in related acquisitions) is associ-
ated with stronger performance. Our analysis (Table A2 in the Appendix) shows that both types
of fit are associated with stronger acquisition performance than the absence of fit, with the differ-
ence being statistically significant in both cases. However, we find no statistically significant dif-
ference in acquisition performance between the two types of fit. Finally, we used CARs as a
measure of acquisition performance in our tests of H3. Although CARs are widely used as a
measure of acquisition performance, they largely reflect the market's assessment of an acqui-
sition at the time of the acquisition announcement, and as such suffer from limitations in
measuring acquisition performance. They could be seen as a short-term stock market signal
regarding how the market perceives the acquisition, and may not accurately reflect the long-
term acquisition performance or the actual value an acquirer creates in an acquisition in the
long term. To further test whether Fit leads to better long-term acquisition performance for
the firm (rather than merely leading to higher short-term announcement returns), we used
an alternative measure of acquisition performance which is long-term oriented and account-
ing based, namely the change in ROA from the year an acquisition is announced to either
two or three years after the acquisition announcement. The results of these tests (Table A2
in the Appendix) are consistent with our main analysis: for both windows, Fit has a positive
and significant effect on the change in ROA.
7 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined how the nature of CEOs' human capital relates to firms' strategic
behavior, and whether the fit between the nature of CEOs' human capital and the strategic
actions they engage in is associated with stronger performance. We have explored these ques-
tions in the context of generalist and specialist CEOs and their acquisition behavior and perfor-
mance. Our initial and preliminary results indicated that generalist CEOs are more acquisitive
than specialist CEOs. Further, conditional on engaging in an acquisition, generalist CEOs are
more likely to engage in diversifying (unrelated) acquisitions than specialist CEOs. These
results are consistent with the idea that CEOs engage in strategic behavior that corresponds to
the nature of their human capital. Our initial findings also suggest that the fit between CEOs'
human capital and the type of acquisitions they engage in is on average associated with stronger
acquisition performance. In this regard, as our main measure of acquisition performance is
based on short-term abnormal announcement returns, our results suggests that, on average, the
stock market reacts positively to an acquisition announcement when the CEO's human capital
fits with the type of acquisition he or she engages in. However, our robustness checks based on
long-term acquisition performance also suggest that acquirers indeed achieve stronger long-
term acquisition performance when there is fit between the CEO's human capital and the
acquisition type.
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Using a two-sided matching model, we examined whether the sorting of CEOs into firms
confounded our results. We found that CEO and firm matching was multidimensional, driven
by several complementarities between their attributes. One complementarity that may affect
our results is the complementarity between the CEO's human capital and that of the board. The
results of the two-sided matching analysis suggest that generalist CEOs' engaging in more
acquisitions is, to some extent, driven by the sorting of generalist CEOs into firms governed by
boards whose members are also generalists. This finding is important as it highlights that com-
plementarities in the matching of CEOs and firms may indeed bias the analysis of how CEO
characteristics affect firm outcomes and possibly invalidate such findings, highlighting the need
for future research in this area to account for these complementarities. Further, the results of
the two-sided matching analysis also suggest that our evidence regarding the generalist CEOs'
tendency to engage in diversifying acquisitions and the better performance achieved when there
is a fit between the CEO's human capital and the acquisition type is robust to the sorting of
CEOs into firms and the associated complementarities of the firm-CEO match.
Our paper makes several contributions. First, it contributes to strategic leadership research
that tests hypotheses on how the characteristics of CEOs affect firm outcomes. In particular, this
paper is among the first in the strategic leadership literature to use a two-sided matching model
with the aim of identifying the complementarities of the firm-CEO match and subsequently
accounting for these complementarities for a better understanding of how CEO characteristics
shape firm outcomes. As CEO-firm complementarities may affect the relationship between other
CEO characteristics and firm outcomes, future research examining how CEO characteristics
shape firm outcomes could utilize this empirical approach to alleviate endogeneity concerns that
stem from the matching of CEOs and firms, thus strengthening the validity of research findings.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on human capital and to research on micro-
foundations in strategy. Our paper highlights that the nature of the human capital of top man-
agers (in our paper, CEOs) can shape firms' strategic behavior. We provide insights into how
managers engage in strategic behavior that corresponds to the nature of their human capital, and
how the fit between the nature of their human capital and the strategic actions they engage in is
associated with stronger performance. Further, our paper suggests an interesting potential path
dependency in executive human capital development, namely how executives with a particular
human capital profile engage in strategic behavior that matches their human capital profile, thus
further entrenching their human capital profile. Third, our paper also contributes to the literature
on acquisitions by highlighting an important factor that can shape acquisition behavior and
acquisition performance: the nature of the CEO's human capital, and the fit between the nature
of the CEO's human capital and the type of acquisitions he or she undertakes.
Our study has some limitations. First, we have used a two-sided matching approach based
on observable characteristics to alleviate endogeneity concerns. However, this approach does
not eliminate the endogeneity bias deriving from potential selection on unobservable character-
istics of the CEO and firm. While we used a substantial number of CEO- and firm-level control
variables which are likely to be correlated with unobservable CEO and firm characteristics, we
cannot rule out that selection on unobservables is biasing our analysis, and thus we need to
interpret our results with caution. Second, there may be several reasons why CEOs engage in
strategic behavior that corresponds to the nature of their human capital, including actively
matching their human capital to opportunities to increase the returns from it (the “active
view”) and engaging in strategies in their “comfort zone” to minimize the additional effort and
risk associated with unfamiliar strategies (the “passive view”). While the support for H3 sug-
gests that it is unlikely that CEOs only pursue their own objectives at the firm's expense, we
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cannot conclusively say which of the two mechanisms is the dominant one behind our findings.
While it is not our paper's goal to differentiate between these two mechanisms, future research
can explore this further.
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